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Sociological research confirms GST applied to ethnicity. 
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Unreciprocated aid among co-ethnics and the emotional intensity of ethnic conflict have long 
been explanatory challenges to evolutionary science. J. P. Rushton’s theory of assortative 
ethnic affiliation–altruism, mating and friendship directed towards fellow ethnics–derives 
from his more general theory of genetic similarity (GST). GST proposes that humans give 
preferential treatment to others in whom they detect genetic resemblance and that such 
behaviour enhances genetic fitness. The theory coincides with W. D. Hamilton’s theory of 
inclusive fitness as applied to relations between populations. GST helps explain core features 
of ethnicity, including its basis in putative kinship and correlation with gene frequencies. 
Ethnic nepotism due to similarity is a weak social force compared to social identity. However 
its pervasiveness makes it a potential driver of evolutionary and social change, a potential 
borne out by sociological studies of the impact of ethnic diversity on social cohesion and 
public altruism. Genomics confirms the theory for interactions within populations with 
sufficient genetic diversity, such as ethnically mixed societies. GST applied to ethnicity is 
promising for further research in evolutionary social science because it unifies evolutionary 
and behavioral mechanisms in a single theory.  
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First copyedit complete. 
 
1. Theoretical background 
 
The evolutionary approach to ethnicity has given priority to understanding affiliation outside 
the family and clan. Why is it that people so often prefer to marry and befriend fellow ethnics 
and defend their ethnic groups? These tendencies are present in all populations, indicating an 
evolutionary origin. But it has not been clear how such altruism could be evolutionarily 
stable. For ethnic solidarity to have evolved there must have been a substantial fitness payoff 
for sacrificing individual fitness for groups or populations that had ethnic characteristics.  
 
An ethnic group is a named population whose members share a belief in common descent, 
have a shared history, a distinctive shared culture, a shared attachment to a homeland, and 
some degree of solidarity (Smith, 1986, pp.22-30). The core elements of this definition, 
including putative kinship, derive from the sociologist Max Weber (1946/1922, p.173). 
Genetic assay data show that ethnic kinship is real (e.g. Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi & Piazza, 
1994, p.75, Table; Harpending, 2002). 
 
An early evolution theory of ethnic solidarity was provided by Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1972/1970; 
1982), who argued that ethnic ties are based on family bonds. Behavioral adaptations for 
bonding with close kin came to be applied to whole populations, first bands, then tribes and 
nations. Affiliation to the hunter-gatherer band was subjected to group selection. The first part 
of this argument was reinterpreted sociobiologically by van den Berghe (1981), using 
Hamilton’s theory of inclusive fitness. In his classic 1964 paper, Hamilton showed that genes 
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resulting boost to their fitness exceeded the fitness cost to the altruist. This condition for the 
evolution of altruism, known as Hamilton’s Rule, was widely accepted by zoologists by 1980.  
 
Like Eibl-Eibesfeldt, van den Berghe argued that because ethnicity is putative kinship, shared 
ethnic identity should release some of the same altruistic motivation found within families. He 
adopted Hamilton’s concept of kin-recognition markers, which included language, territory, 
religion, and phenotypic similarity based on shared culture (language, clothing or 
scarification) and physical appearance. These recognition markers, which overlap those 
proposed by Weber, had evolved as releasers of nepotism because in the evolutionary 
environment they signaled kinship, though with different degrees of reliability (see also Shaw 
and Wong, 1989). Van den Berghe’s theory appeared when sociobiological studies of animal 
altruism and kinship were appearing. This was the background against which Rushton and 
colleagues proposed their own theory.  
 
2. Rushton’s contribution 
 
In 1984 Rushton and co-authors R. J. H. Russell and H. G. Wells proposed an evolutionary 
theory of ethnic altruism based on Genetic Similarity Theory (GST). GST seeks to explain a 
number of prosocial behaviors including ethnic affiliation, by generalizing Hamilton’s theory 
such that genetic similarity alone elicits affiliative behavior without knowledge of 
genealogical kinship. 
 
[W]e propose genetic similarity detection as a mechanism by which organisms are 
attracted and repelled by each other. We hypothesize that genetically similar others 
(“strangers,” as well as “kin”) have a tendency to seek each other out and provide 

















anuscript          





to form natural antipathies and provide mutually hostile environments (Rushton et al., 
1984, pp.179-80).  
 
The theory included evolutionary causality by asserting that responding differentially to 
genetic similarity increases an organism’s fitness, defined as increased genetic representation 
in the population. It allowed for altruism among kin as well as among similar strangers. The 
theory held that assortment is stronger for the more heritable characteristics because they are 
more reliable indicators of genetic similarity, based on sociometrical data as well as a 
quantitative model by W. D. Hamilton (1996/1971). 
 
The resulting theory of ethnic affiliation was more behaviorally detailed than Eibl-
Eibesfeldt’s and more general than van den Berghe’s. Whereas social science research into 
ethnicity had been published in journals of sociology and anthropology, the new approach 
shifted the locus to psychology, ethology, and behavior genetics. Attention began to shift to 
genetics and selection theory.  
 
Rushton continued to develop GST over the following years. In 1985 the team of Rushton, 
Russell and Wells again presented GST and argued that assortative mating for personality 
influenced the evolution of variation in human personality types. They combined GST with 
reciprocal altruism theory to predict that genetic similarity facilitates reciprocity by reducing 
the condition of complete reciprocity (Rushton et al., 1985, p.80).  
 
The major statement of the relation between ethnic nepotism and genetic similarity was a 
paper by Rushton in Behavioral and Brain Sciences (Rushton, 1989a). One addition was data 
indicating that similarity among spouses and friends is strongest in the most heritable 
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intelligence g than they are in particular cognitive abilities such as vocabulary or arithmetic, 
and g is generally the more heritable cognitive ability. The same difference applies to the 
overall assemblage of traits on which spouses are similar, including anthropometrics 
(Rushton, 1989a, p.534; Russell & Rushton, 1985).  
 
In the BBS article Rushton speculated about how similarity could give rise to ethnocentric 
ideology. He reviewed the literature on extended phenotypic effects of genes, focusing on the 
idea that epigenetic developmental rules can incline people towards constructing and learning 
ideologies that increase their fitness (pp.515-16). This led to a review of models and empirical 
findings supporting the theory that group selection in humans has been led by cultural 
strategies. Socialization pressure could have included mutual monitoring and moralistic 
aggression (p.517). “In the evolutionary past . . . those groups that adopted an optimum 
degree of ethnocentric ideology may have replicated their genes more successfully than those 
that did not” (p.518).  
 
Limitation of space precludes reviewing all evidence for and against GST as it was applied to 
ethnicity. Instead we limit discussion to four major objections that are of special relevance to 
ethnicity and whose failure has left the theory more firmly grounded.  
 
The first criticism is that inclusive fitness processes can only operate between genealogical 
kin because their genes are identical by common descent (Mealey 1985; Tooby & Cosmides 
1989). Hamilton’s 1964 paper is cited in support of this objection which, if true, causes the 
genetic similarity theory of ethnic nepotism to fail. However, Hamilton dropped the identical-
by-descent criterion in the early 1970s (e.g. Hamilton, 1996/1971, p.221; discussed by 
Pepper, 2000, pp.355-6). Genetic similarity is a sufficient basis for inclusive fitness to 
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A second criticism has been that ethnic kinship is too slight ever to justify diverting effort 
from genealogical kin. A related criticism is that a gift or other benefit always yields a larger 
genetic payoff when directed to close kin than to co-ethnics. However, Hamilton himself 
showed that the aggregate kinship in populations can be sufficient to allow investment in it to 
be adaptive (Hamilton, 1996/1971, p.221). Harpending derived the same result (Harpending, 
1979). And it is feasible for individuals to contribute to the welfare of multitudes via 
collective goods, such as big game hunting, group defense, and punishment of free-riders 
(Goetze, 2007).  
 
The third criticism of GST was made by Grafen (1990, p.51) who argued that for altruism to 
pay off, shared genes must occur frequently in the genome, which he thought was not the case 
beyond genealogical kin. Leek and Smith (1989, p.534) cite Grafen to conclude: “[I]t seems 
important for Rushton to provide a more convincing rationale for the existence of sufficient 
degrees of overall genetic similarity amongst non-relatives . . .” Grafen’s criticism may hold 
for selection within outbred populations. However, ethnic kinship is considerable within 
ethnically partitioned populations. Ethnic kinship was estimated in 2002 by Harpending to 
average 15% between unrelated populations (Harpending, 2002). The example given in 
section 3.2 below finds a kinship of 6%, equivalent to that with a great grandparent, more than 
sufficient to meet Grafen’s criterion.  
 
A fourth criticism proceeded from the reformation in Anthropology that followed World War 
II and was established in the 1970s consequent to the Vietnam War. According to the dogma 
people were really gentle, peaceful, and nice except for disruptions caused by colonialism. 
Even more pervasive was the new “pots not peoples” view of human mobility. In this 
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neighboring groups only over short distances. Given this, people rarely if ever encountered 
others unlike themselves so there was never any selection in favor of ethnic or racial 
recognition and discrimination. A familiar saying was that we were foragers “for 99% of our 
existence”. The criticism is dubious for two reasons. First, it discounts the possibility that 
humans can detect slight phenotypic resemblances. Secondly, the claim of low mobility has 
difficulties. Agriculture is about 10,000 years old while fully modern humans are only 45,000 
or so years old, and we have no reason to think that bursts of innovation and population 
growth and decline have been limited to agricultural peoples. If, as is likely, human history 
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3.  Subsequent Genetic Similarity Research on Ethnic Nepotism 
3.1  Social behavior 
In a follow-up exchange on his 1989 paper, Rushton (1991) hypothesized and discussed 
methods for detecting ethnic nepotism in science. He recommended studying journal citations 
to search for assortment of authors. His hypothesis was confirmed using the citation method 
in a large-scale study of European journals conducted by Greenwald and Schuh (1994).  
 
In 1997 Rushton discussed the stability of states experiencing changing ethnic proportions. He 
observed that the Soviet empire had fragmented into its constituent nations and argued that 
ethnic conflict due to genetic dissimilarity was a rising centripetal force within the United 
States and Canada due to increasing diversity. Welfare was a likely divisive factor (p.375). He 
examined a proposal for the partial ethnic partition of the US as guided by individual choice 
as a means for reducing conflict. In a 2005 paper Rushton argued that GST was compatible 
with the theory of ethno-symbolism, according to which nations form around pre-existing 
ethnic groups and are perpetuated by the founding ethny’s myth-symbol complex.  
 
The theory that ethnic groups are pools of genetic similarity has helped inspire sociological 
research. GST presaged the study of ethnic altruism as a social force. It conceptualized ethnic 
groups as extended kinship, with greater genetic similarity within than between. It connected 
to van den Berghe’s concept of ethnic nepotism, which predicts more generous charity within 
than between ethnic groups (Rushton, 1984, p.78).  
 
Thus from its initial formulation, GST set many parameters of the study of ethnic nepotism. It 
is consistent with the mainstream definition of ethnicity given earlier, which includes 
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of ethnic groups, again consistent with Weber, and the study of charity and other forms of 
altruism has successfully tested Rushton’s prediction.  
 
Sociological research confirms GST applied to ethnicity (Salter, 2007). Trust and the risky 
joint enterprises it facilitates are more common within than among ethnic groups (Salter, 
2002), giving an ethnic dimension to middleman trading groups, organized crime, dissidents 
from totalitarian regimes, and nationalist freedom fighters. Rushton’s prediction that ethnic 
diversity lowers trust and cooperation has been confirmed in the United States and Australia 
(Putnam, 2007; Leigh, 2010).  
 
Ethnic similarity also affects charitable donations to strangers in need, as predicted by GST. 
Field studies of street beggars in Eastern Europe find that passersby give more generously to 
beggars of the same ethnicity (Butovskaya, Salter, Diakonov & Smirnov, 2000). Global 
comparisons of government expenditure show that ethno-linguistic diversity explains over 
30% of the variance in support for welfare (r = -0.56) (Sanderson & Vanhanen, 2004, Table 
6.4, p.120). Diversity explains 80% of the variance in foreign aid expenditure after controlling 
for national income and overall budget (r ≈ -0.9). It also correlates negatively with economic 
growth for all except the wealthiest 10% of economies (Masters & McMillan, 2004). A likely 
explanation is that diversity decreases national cohesion and the ability of governments to 
make rational economic decisions (Alesina, Baqir & Easterly 1999; Alesina & Spolaore 2003; 
Easterly & Levine 1997). An Australian study has confirmed the similarity-cohesion link 
(Healy, 2007).  
 
3.2  Genomics and Kin Recognition 
With the arrival of inexpensive technology to genotype individuals at large numbers of single 
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in the terminology of genetics) between individuals within and between groups. For example 
worldwide samples of individuals from human populations assessed hundreds of thousands of 
polymorphic markers are easily available on the internet (http://www.hgdp.org). Here we 
explore such patterns in several populations. What we present here is essentially an 
elaboration of previous work that confirmed Rushton’s arguments concerning ethnic kinship 
and the extra parental kinship resulting from endogamous marriage (Harpending, 1979; 2002; 
Salter, 2002). 
While much of inclusive theory has been developed in terms of the coefficient of relationship, 
everything is easier when it is written in terms of the coefficient of kinship. For example the 
coefficient of relationship, the “fraction of shared genes” is unity with oneself. But what if a 
person is highly inbred? Then we need something to recognize that such a person is “more 
related” to himself than the offspring of a random mating or an outbred mating. 
Kinship with oneself in an infinite random mating population is ½ rather than 1, derived like 
this. Pick an allele from a locus from a person, then pick another from the same locus in the 
same individual and ask if it is the same. The probability it is the same is just ½, but if the 
individual is inbred it is greater than ½ and if the individual is outbred it is less. Similar 
reasoning applies to any pair of individuals. In this formalism, the coefficient of relationship 
of person a to person b is the ratio of a’s kinship with b to a’s kinship with himself. This has 
the strange property that the relationship of a to b is not necessarily the same as the 
relationship of b to a (for details see Harpending, 1979; 2002).  
Given the databases published by the Human Genome Diversity project it is relatively 
straightforward to compute pairwise kinship in their samples.  In Figure 1, for example, are 
results from nearly a million single nucleotide polymorphisms in the 29 individuals of the 
HGDP French sample. The top panel shows all pairwise kinships while the bottom panel 
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Notice in the top panel of Figure 1 the cluster of mass around ½: these comparisons are 
people with themselves showing the variation around the theoretical value of ½ in this large 
real population. Some are more inbred than others. The bottom panel shows that if these 29 
people were, say, adult males in a small community there is little or no opportunity to exploit 
genetic similarity to form nepotistic cooperative arrangements. The best one can do is around 
1%, meaning that helping your closest (stranger) kin is worth about 2% of helping oneself by 
the same amount, 4% as much as helping one’s own child, etc. Doing so would depend on the 
ability to discern 1% genetic kinship, which is implausible. Rushton’s extensive data showing 
similarity among friends and spouses is unlikely to be due to such a low degree of genetic 
resemblance. Altruism via incomplete reciprocity fails for the same reasons. Investing in 
aggregates is not feasible because strangers are not grouped by family or clan or ethnicity. 
These genetic data therefore disconfirm Genetic Similarity Theory within outbred 
populations.  




The pattern for the Japanese is hardly different from that of the French. Now let us suppose 
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brought together in the one community. In this new community we can repeat the calculations 




This new diverse community looks like nature red in tooth and claw in the making. Imagine 
for example that conditions are Malthusian and that one can share a transient surplus with a 
neighbor, thereby increasing the latter’s individual fitness. If a person can recognize ethnic 
kin using cultural or heritable markers, he can pick a neighbor with kinship of 0.06 almost 
every time, corresponding to kinship with a great-grandchild. If at marginal cost he confers 
some fitness benefit on this neighbor, this is equivalent to increasing his own fitness by 12% 
(0.06/0.50) of that benefit. On the other hand if he confers the same benefit to a neighbor with 
kinship -0.06, that decreases his own fitness by the same 12%. Discrimination can therefore 
cause an action or relationship to yield a 24% difference in fitness. This is an extraordinarily 
strong selective force, and any quantitative trait that favored ethnic kin discrimination would 
be rapidly selected with consequences easily visible within a few hundreds to thousands of 
years. The effect would be stronger when the benefit was conferred on aggregated ethnic 
kinship via a collective good; so strong as to select for the extreme altruism associated with 
violent ethnic conflict. Thus GST is confirmed for interactions between populations, such as 
adjacent or mixed ethnic groups. More generally, GST is confirmed for situations in which 
population subdivision creates significant genetic diversity. Another example is endogamous 
classes, the extreme case being castes. GST would also apply to small isolates, inbred 
populations where ancestry links are short due to cousin-cousin and uncle-niece marriages. In 
these populations kinship outside nuclear families is extremely varied, making it possible for 
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4. Amendments and future research 
Rushton’s theory of ethnic nepotism explains broad trends in ethnic affiliation and has been 
productive in generating empirical research. One shortcoming in the original formulation is 
that GST does not account for the way ethnic solidarity varies from culture to culture and 
within cultures over time. Although solidarity is inherent to ethnicity, it is usually of moderate 
or low intensity. However, it strengthens in response to attacks perceived to be aimed at group 
identity, especially invasion of the homeland and physical harm done to co-ethnics. The latter 
are far more efficient releasers of ethnic sentiment than are perceptions of similarity alone 
(Salter, 2008a). Even a symbolic threat to group status, such as an ethnic slur, can produce an 
intense emotional response.  
  
GST needs to be modified if it is to explain both the quiescence and passion of ethnicity. 
Ethnic nepotism’s sensitivity to culture and situation sets it apart from the more constant 
familial bonds. Sustaining high levels of solidarity requires sustained cultural stimulation. 
Minorities that have retained ethnic solidarity over long periods have religious rituals that 
keep alive historical memories of victories and defeats across generations (Spicer, 1971).  
 
An example of the sensitivity of ethnic nepotism to culture and situation is provided by 
Kurzban, Tooby & Cosmides (2001), who found that participants in an experiment were less 
prone to categorize others by race when the others’ race did not correlate with coalition 
membership. The same was not true of categorization by sex, which remained robust even 
when coalitions contained men and women. This paper might be taken as a challenge to 
Rushton’s theory because the authors concluded that race is a proxy for coalition, a 
formulation incompatible with ethnic categorization being “automatic and mandatory” and 
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relations and describes weak ties. It should also be noted that Kurzban et al.’s hypothesis 
might be difficult to generalize because it is based on erroneous evolutionary assumptions. 
They describe race as a construct that corresponds to inconsequential genetic difference, 
based on an argument by Lewontin (1972) (p. 15387). Though influential, this argument is 
fallacious because genetic and phenotypic variation among populations is substantial 
(Edwards, 2003). Kurzban et al. also assert that in the environment in which humans evolved 
individuals would not have met members of other races. As noted earlier, this ignores both the 
human capacity to detect small intra-racial group differences and the high likelihood that 
regular contact of very different peoples occurred over most of human history.  
 
Amendments have been proposed to both the evolutionary and behavioral components of 
GST’s account of ethnic nepotism, though none that contradict the core insight. As already 
noted in Section 2, the evolutionary part of the theory, especially involving group selection, 
becomes more plausible when combined with the concepts of aggregate kinship and collective 
goods. In competitions between primordial ethnic populations, especially in defending 
territory, tribal fighters defended aggregate kinships comparable in scale to aggregate family 
kinship (Salter, 2007/2003, pp.63-7). In the case of hunter-gatherer bands and tribal units it 
was possible to invest in aggregate kinship by contributing to collective goods, such as 
defense and big game hunting (Goetze, 2007).  
 
The behavioral component of GST is also being improved by findings from social psychology 
and sociology, aided by the heuristic advantages of theories that combine evolutionary and 
behavioural mechanisms. In doing so GST is helping unite the known causes of ethnic 
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It will be useful to explore interactions between innate categorization of human kinds, social 
identification, and attraction to similar others. By age three infants categorize themselves and 
others into descent groups and apply this to distinguishing races (Hirschfeld, 1996). The 
attraction of phenotypic similarity is weaker than the ties of ethnic identity. However, 
similarity cues an implicit state that can position individuals for a transition to explicit ethnic 
identity (MacDonald, 1998, pp.1-15; 2008). Evolutionary theories that conceptualize 
organized religion as group strategies point to links between religiously inspired altruism and 
group reproductive interests (MacDonald, 1994; Wilson, 2002). Brain scan technology is 
helping illuminate the mental structures that distinguish implicit and explicit ethnicity 
(Lieberman, Hariri, Jarcho, Eisenberger & Bookheimer, 2005; Norton, Mason, Vandello & 
Biga, 2012). Further work is needed to identify the factors that modulate group-identity and 
which ethnic markers release greatest affiliative motivation. It should also be useful to 
distinguish the kinds of affiliation involved, and how they interact with moral sentiments 
(Salter, 2008b). Rushton’s important discoveries concerning genetic ethnic similarity are yet 
to be fully mined.  
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